The uprising in Syria grinds on into its 18th month. What was once hailed as a shining example of the Arab Spring, now has devolved into a grimy, ugly civil war – another blood-soaked display of the under-gunned rabble of noble insurgents seeking to throw over a ‘coup-proofed’ tyrant and his henchmen. We have all the usual international players weighing in. The impotency of the United Nations efforts is on display to the watching world. You do not have to be John Mearsheimer to feel exasperated by that charade. In addition, as the US presidential election campaign rhetoric heats up, the rivals of Obama have framed his response to the Syrian crisis as evidence of his indecisiveness. Russia and China have been vilified in Western circles for supporting Bashar al Assad, the ophthalmologist turned dictator of Syria. Whether or not the UN mission is flawed (likely), Obama is indecisive (likely) or the Russians and Chinese are obstructing Western political initiatives (likely), the Syrian opposition appears to be a very disorganized movement – a high risk partner if there ever was one. They are making the erstwhile Libyan resistance look downright organized and efficient. In today’s NYT, a piece ran on the election of a new leader of the (main?) opposition group, the Syrian National Council.
I excerpted the following to highlight how the philosophy of a revolution by committee looks and sounds:
The ideal leadership of the council is not through one person — because no one is elected and has actual legitimacy,” said Bassma Kodmani, a member of the executive committee. Until such time as there are free elections in Syria, she said, the choice of the president of the council should be made by consensus….
“The revolution does not want to see a big leader, or one individual who leads everything,” Ms. Kodmani said. “Personalization leads to polarization…
Still, critics both in the wider membership of the council and outside the group said Mr. Sieda had emerged as the consensus choice precisely because he represents no one, either inside Syria or out. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and liberals in the council concluded that he did not pose a threat or provide an advantage to any bloc within the council, they said, but for the same reasons he will have little real authority, and the bickering will continue.
The Muslim Brotherhood, especially, does not want a strong person, neither someone with political strength nor a strong personality,” said Hasan Kasem, a young liberal activist.”
This is how a failing revolutionary organization thinks. From my readings of revolutionary (or resistance) leaders past and present including Washington, Mao, Guevara, al Banna, bin Laden, Yassin, Nasrallah, I don’t get the impression that this is how they would have mobilized the masses to overthrow their oppressors. I am no devotee of the ‘charismatic leader’ cult of leadership, but if half of what this article suggests is true, the Syrian opposition holds little promise for any strategic partners from the West.
In my research, I test a variety of variables that serve as drivers of organizational legitimacy for insurgent movements such as the Syrian National Council. They would fail miserably on the level of professionalism factors – innovation, efficiency, cohesion. They initiated the uprising in the hopes of peacefully resisting the tyrant. Paraphrasing Reuel March Gerecht (and hearing echoes of Bismarck’s Realpolitik): “When hard power meets soft power, hard power wins – at least in the short term.” Noble but likely (and sadly) misguided. They are an organization in disarray and create serious doubts in the minds of the prospective investors (i.e., the US, European nations, friendly Arab countries or foes of Syria) or prospective followers.
If the US or any other power decides to get involved in Syria, they will need to be ‘all in’ since the nascent resistance organization appears to be unable to overcome its debilitating differences to be of much help. Assad is a man intent on holding on to power at all costs including the destruction of his nation.
CDF,
Great posting! Although I agree with your reasoning, the ten-count has not been sounded just yet. One thing that the Arab Spring has shown me is that some of those authoritarian leaders who responded with acts of brutality (Mubarak, Qadaffi) to the mass protests in their respective countries wound up being overthrown themselves. By engaging in acts of brutality, the Syrian regime has lost all of its popular legitimacy. From here on out, it can only rule through fear and violence. Such acts of brutality have also jeopardized its international stature, thereby lessening its chances that it can maintain control within its borders in the long run. The oppositionists can thus work to use this to their advantage. In the meantime, however, many innocent people are dying. The bottom line is this: I don’t see this regime being toppled anytime soon, but I don’t see it enduring for much longer either. An interesting question that I find myself asking, and this cuts into your research albeit in a tangential way, reads as follows: why do some authoritarian regimes facing mass protests to their holds on power carry out successful crackdowns while others fail in their efforts, thereby leading to downfall?
CJS
Professor Sullivan
thank you for the response and an interesting follow up question. Trained as we were by the great Professor Susan Sell in IR theory, the answers to the variation in outcomes re challenges to authoritarian regimes likely lies in a blend of IV’s at the system, state and unit levels. Look for a more thoughtful response to your question in another post but let me lay down a couple thoughts here re Egypt and Libya. The biggest question mark i have re Egypt is why the military didn’t brutally suppress the uprising – and how did the rebels know they would not? Mubarak cooped those guys long ago. Why did they think that the financial gravy train was going to be any better with a new gov? Mubarak played the liberalized autocracy drill for years and got away with it (http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/gratis/Dan_Brumberg.pdf). Puzzles for another day. With Libya the thing that strikes me there is the international pariah status of Ghaddafi. He was complicit in the murder of a sacred political figure in Lebanon (Imam Musa al Sadr) and so pissed off a lot of erstwhile friends in that arena. We know how he was viewed in the West. Even a half ass NATO effort took him out. So two variables i would explore are: the “leaning” of the military (the praetorian guard) and the willingness of the international players (not the UN but NATO or indiv countries) to join forces and oust a tyrant. Because history matters, one need to also account for recent actions – so in Libya, the NATO action may have been all the system could bear for another x years before Russia and China get the willies about the west using unilateral force against a potential ally in their own attempts to manipulate international events. thoughts to start. thanks for the ideas.
CDF,
With respect to the Egyptian military, I’m somewhat in the dark about its decision-making vis-a-vis siding against Mubarak on account of my Russo/Soviet-centric background. That said, should we be looking at the military or the secret police in trying to account for how some authoritarian regimes endure while others succumb to collapse? Speaking from my respective part of the world (FSU), it’s the secret police and not the military that plays the major role in ensuring regime continuity.
That said, the Egyptian military may well have reasoned that if they had chosen to crack down, then the would have paired themselves with Mubarak for good, thus making it likely that he would be able to control his succession process. In other words, the brass may have viewed the decision as such: Either we throw our lot in with Mubarak and become his permanent lackey and risk international isolation, further economic disaster, and potential civil war all in the process of doing so if we choose to crack down hard, or we gamble with siding against Mubarak and try to position ourselves so that we retain independent influence in post-Mubarak Egypt.
With respect to Qadaffi, NATO played the major role in causing his ouster/death. I believe that he would be alive today and Libya would resemble Syria had NATO not intervened. I would encourage you to look into some of the CP literature here as well, for there are quite a few domestic factors (several of which deal with the nature of a country’s economy) which could be working to help Syria stay afloat.
CJS
CJS
thanks for the comments. Point well taken re the state military vs. the secret police. You are right to note that the analyst should distinguish since there are numerous occasions where it matters (e.g., SS or SA vs. the Wehrmacht or the Republican Guard Units vs. the regular army). Where there is a praetorian guard equivalent, the analyst should note and separate that out. Coup-proofing tyrants know how to erect and manage secret police (mukhbarrat).Thanks.
In regards to Egypt, I would guess that the Egyptian military did some evaluation of the prospects of hanging with HM vs. going ‘with the people’. They did their strategic calculations and sided with what ultimately appears to be the right group. But few in our world could see that coming. many of these guys are wealthy from the graft that flowed for being a loyal lackey of mubarak – for a long time (probably since Nasser in the 50s). The mystery for me is how (if at all) did the revolutionaries pick up on the way the military was leaning. I don’t know the relative strength of the military vs. the secret police in Egypt but i will bet that the military has more tanks and guns than the secret police. To overthrow the gov you need them to defect or stay neutral.
Re Libya, agree that Ghaddafi is still in power if NATO doesn’t intervene. mY point is that NATO DID intervene. They don’t do it everywhere, every time (like Syria or North Korea). GHaddafi had enough of a public record as a scoundrel that few would weep for this removal in the international community. Assad is a different guy and Syria is a different state with different friends (Iran, China, Russia) that want to see Assad in power. I surely don’t want to limit the causal factors to material things only, but in this case, the Syrian military (plus the shabbiha) are largely remaining true to the tyrant – they are betting on him to survive this (as dad did in 82 when the MB tried feebly to throw him over).
I would love to look at the literature you reference. Any starters?
Much as I will regret the heat that I take for the analogy, trying to impose logic and reason on the majority of nations and peoples in the middle east is like trying to herd cats. Cats have individual agendas and without a common and immediate goal such as hunger – temporary as it may be – alliances break down very quickly.
With people, there is very little in the way of common goals or group identity beyond identities that pivot around religion – a subject that begs confrontation since, unless you believe in my god you are just simply wrong (or worse, uneducated). One only needs to look at the results of the Egyptian “spring” which was, by all comparisons, organized, to see that once the single and simple (yes, simple compared to battles yet to be fought and arguments left to resolved) objective has been achieved (overthrow) you have a state that is run by the military past opposed at the polls by fractured and fragmented groups with the only organizing principle being the “Brotherhood” which is the absolutism of religion. So, absolutism of religion or absolutism of religion. Fear on both counts as the motivator for compliance.
Tribal peoples (including the Israelis) are a fractious bunch who organize temporarily to accomplish a specific goal and then dissolve partnerships and working alliances that do not fit the next battle they choose to fight. So, into whose hands do you put the AK-47? The friend of today or the enemy of tomorrow? If you read between the lines you see Mubarak and our support for him as well as our carefully cultivated support for terrorists and tyrants like Karzai as we object strongly to those of similar ilk in Pakistan.
These situations are gambles with about the same odds as at the tables in Vegas. Our problem is that we cannot always figure out who is “the house.” Or, more likely, who is the house for how long.
This fickle nature is one of the reasons why evolution has failed to bring peace to the middle east. While I am not sure that bold initiatives such as the Lebanese incursion or settlements in Palestinian territory will always succeed, they offer more hope (if we are prepared to police the outcome and prevent reversion) than talking forever (Iran) while we make incremental but only negligible progress along the margins.
Bold strokes and enforcement as you described – all-in in Syria – offer a better shot for the long term if we can swim through the blood of tomorrow. Careful, my friend, the ground is treacherous and your friends are only temporary.
Rabbi!!! nice to see you out here. Thank you for weighing in on this weighty matter. A few thoughts from my perch on the sidelines of all of this.
As i noted to another friend re my post on Hamas, I am reluctant to draw too heavily on the ‘culture variable’ when explaining politics in the middle east (or anywhere for that matter). Cultural factors do matter but they change so slowly that they don’t do a very good job of explaining variations in political outcomes or the behavior of the actors in the mix. Samuel Huntington (http://www.amazon.com/Clash-Civilizations-Remaking-World-Order/dp/0684819872/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1339512381&sr=1-4) would disagree with me and so would Bernard Lewis (http://www.amazon.com/What-Went-Wrong-Between-Modernity/dp/0060516054/ref=sr_1_4?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1339512452&sr=1-4), but i side with many other scholars who see more secular and strategic calculations underneath the actions of these groups than pure ideology. For sure, ideas matter – a lot. But as my teacher, Nathan Brown, shared in a recent post on Hamas:
“For a movement like Hamas, one that prides itself on holding fast to fixed general principles while also being very practical and flexible in their application, formal ideological renunciations are often the last stage of a movement’s evolution.”
While these groups debate and squabble (a lot) it is amazing that they don’t implode more often and sooner. Nathan likens it to democratic centralism that was a feature of leninist politics. They bicker a lot behind closed doors but, as a leadership team, don’t break ranks in public. That is an effective version. The Syrian version is a mess right now.
Ideas and culture matter in all of this. But so does the actions of major powers, the history of authoritarianism and the current socio economic mess that is the middle east.
Thoughts?