I will be exploring the means that violent mass social movements use to gain the support of the masses for their cause. Ian Hurd nicely teases out three basic forms of social control to manage societies. Some use coercion. Some use the promise of payments of various kinds (directed at the follower’s immediate self interest) to get the commitment of the followers. Others use power that has been legitimated – limited in some way – to gain and keep the commitment of the followers. Some use all of these at different times in the life of the organization. Its the causal role of legitimated power in the organization’s resilience that I want to pay particular attention to.  Max Weber believed that ‘turning raw power into legitimate authority was the central dilemma of politics’.[1] Legitimacy and legitimated power are nuanced terms and require a more detailed discussion. I always get crossed-eyed looks when I use these terms. Fair enough. It took me a bit of time to unpack these important variables (with a special nod to Erik Voeten for his early help) to help me get empirical traction on them. Another post to come on that but I will try to make it as painless as possible.

The first four cases I am researching are: Hezbollah (Lebanon), Hamas (Gaza), the Provisional IRA (Northern Ireland) and the al-Haqqani network (Afghanistan). I will likely stray from a strict diet of these groups and their search for their new frontiers. Ideas matter to these groups. The outcomes they say they want to deliver to their followers often transcend the basic needs of security and prosperity. They sometimes promise freedom. They sometimes promise an honorable identity. These groups all have had rivals to contend with let alone the state and its allies. They have all endured major shocks (e.g., battle loss and oddly electoral victory) that have destabilized the group. How do they pick themselves up and carry on?