Hamas is a party on the edge of the political system of the Palestinian Territories in which it operates. It is viewed by most in the West as ‘beyond the pale’. Hamas is ideologically at odds with Fatah, its chief rival, with regards to how best to lead and represent the best interests of the Palestinian people in the international arena. It seeks an Islamic state based, to the extent possible, on Sharia law. Its pledge to annihilate Israel and its persistent use of violence against Israel – with a disproportionate amount of its targets being “soft” and civilian – has justifiably earned it a reputation as a political outcast, a party on the edge. Yet the international community’s withdrawal of financial aid and Israel’s routine and harsh economic and military countermeasures against Hamas seem to be unable to deter Hamas and its followers. The organization is now over 25 years old and is nothing if not resilient. It is bloodied but unbowed.
In 2006, Hamas shocked itself and the world when it defeated Fatah in national elections. Independent observers credit its victory to a well-managed political campaign by an effective and savvy political party who knew how to work its grass-roots support (surprisingly in the major cities of the Territories). Voters thought Hamas had a better platform to meet the basic needs of the Palestinian people – get rid of corruption in government (be the anti-Fatah), effectively engage Israel in much-desired peace negotiations and address the dismal economic conditions of the Territories. But that victory brought little peace for Hamas and the Palestinian people. Internecine warfare between Hamas and Fatah and splinters from Hamas (e.g., Salafist Jihadi groups) still threaten the coherence of the group and its ability to effectively govern. Fatah and Hamas have repeatedly failed to overcome their differences and form a national unity government and are now out of position to exploit an opening to negotiate with a more coherent Israeli government.
Hamas is a party that has demonstrated its bona fides as a democratic movement even if it is in the ‘cat and mouse’ style suited to the semi-authoritarian environment it exists within. Talk of Islamist movements as inherently anti-democratic are misguided and off the point, some even having a hint of old-fashioned Orientalism. Hamas’ challenges are less about illiberal skeletons in their closet and more about moving beyond the grinding power struggles with Fatah to finally form a unified front to engage the Israelis politically. Hamas is no stranger to ideological debates. They have overcome their resistance to participating in the political process – now finish the job. Hamas is no Hezbollah militarily nor does it have the logistical advantages of its Shia ally vis-a-vis Syria and Iran. It cannot hope to coerce Israel to the bargaining table based on its military prowess. Hamas needs to double down on what it knows best how to do – mobilize the grass-roots support and find the common ground to unify the Palestinian factions. Hamas on the edge will lead nowhere good for the Palestinian people and its Israeli neighbors.
Effective governance seems to be an elusive objective for an organization that is unable to form alliances within thier own borders and is focused on destruction of a neighboring country. It seems more like the foundation for perpetual turmoil.
It is true that the Hamas term as a governor has been a challenging one at best. Based on research by Nathan Brown (When Victory is Not an Option), many fellow Islamist movements in the region thought that Hamas overstepped its bounds by winning the election in 2006. There is a sense that ‘participate but don’t dominate’ elections by the Islamist groups in the region. Hamas was clearly not ready to function as a ruling party. They do not seem to have moved out of the broad social movement state to even a proto-party state. Alliances with Fatah – especially across such an ideologically wide space – seem unlikely at this point.
Dave M asked these questions: What impact will the Egyptian election have on Hamas’ future?…if Muslim B wins, or if the Old Guard wins? More broadly, will the Arab Spring-turned-hot-summer change the Hamas v. Fattah dynamic in Palestine?
My quick take, humbly, since i am quite a distance from the action:
The Egyptian elections to date have surprised me in that the electorate tilted towards two ends of the political spectrum: the law and order candidate (Shafiq) and the Islamist candidate (Morsi). See http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/05/27/egypt-elections-setback-for-transition/az8a for more scoop there. While the Egyptian MB is the mother movement for the MB of Palestine (now effectively Hamas), theirs is a loose federation. The Egyptian MB cautioned Hams not to dominate in the 2006 election (participate, not dominate). They didn’t listen and paid for it with a rough first several years (disaster?) as a governor. My other immediate thought is that the peace treaty with Israel is more highly valued by the Shafiq gang than the Morsi gang. If the MB win/dominate Parliament then they would be more inclined to forgo the $ from the US that the treaty entails vs. Shafiq. That chilling of the relations btw Egypt and Israel will not likely convert to a hot war (The Egyptian military knows they are outmatched and have other bigger issues to deal with domestically) but it will mean looser borders and enhanced ability to smuggle weapons/money/etc into Palestine along the Egyptian/Gaza border. Useful since Gaza has been essentially cut off to date. More on Fatah in next message.
further question from Dave M: “will the Arab Spring-turned-hot-summer change the Hamas v. Fattah dynamic in Palestine?”
to clarify, i am assuming by ‘hot summer’ you mean an increased urgency in the middle east to accelerate the transition from authoritarian/semi-authoritarian to the more liberal, representative forms of government. if yes, then this answer will be relevant. if not, then please advise.
I am relatively suspicious of the Fatah and Hamas relationship. These groups see the world differently but Hamas has shown its ideological stance is flexible. They do deals. There have been some movements in the last few years that are positive but i don’t see it having much to do with the Arab Spring/summer per se. Fatah’s legacy of corruption and brutal repression of its rivals (Arafat years when he had all the money via PA donors) will color the Hamas/Fatah dynamic fora long time. Hamas behaved very badly in 2007 when they brutally tossed Fatah security units from Gaza. My hunch is that as the old guard of Fatah (and Hamas) die/are killed/lose power there would be at least a chance to broach a new relationship. Politics matters more now than ever to Hamas. Fatah saw politics as important but was egregiously authoritarian. Hamas, at least, so far has shown a clear tendency for a consultative model.They prefer Shura vs. democratic since they have clear views on the primacy of the whole of society vs. individual rights ala the enlightenment. Thoughts?